Part
III
The fall of Srebrenica
Chapter 9
The departure of Dutchbat from Srebrenica
6. The arrangements for the withdrawal and the route
Early in
the evening of 13 July Karremans had received guidelines from Sarajevo for the
negotiations with Mladic on a Dutchbat withdrawal. All the Displaced Persons,
apart from the wounded, had already left the enclave. The guidelines were drawn
up by Colonel De Ruiter. There were two versions: one in Dutch and one in
English. Both faxes had the same number, and the same date and time. The
existence of the Dutch fax prompted journalist Frank Westerman to infer later
that this was a piece of private communication between The Hague and Sarajevo.
This will be further addressed at the end of this chapter.
The orders from Sarajevo were that Dutchbat was
to leave the enclave with all its combat vehicles, weapons and communication
equipment. The blue helmets, berets and shrapnel-proof vests had priority, but
the other UN equipment and infrastructure and the personal equipment could be
relinquished. Dutchbat had to take along the local UN personnel, and take
particular care for the British military personnel. Karremans also heard that
Nicolai had been appointed authorized negotiator on behalf of both UNPROFOR and
the Dutch Government. If the negotiations with Mladic reached a deadlock, then
Karremans was to inform Nicolai immediately.[1]
The instructions also included suggestions for the withdrawal route.
As soon as he received the UNPROFOR guidelines
Karremans informed Mladic in writing of his instructions. He also passed on the
routes stipulated by Sarajevo. Karremans stretched the UNPROFOR instructions
slightly by saying that he had to take along the personnel of Médecins Sans Frontičres in addition to
the local UN staff and all the wheeled vehicles, computers, personal
possessions and clothing.[2]
Mladic answered the following day that he would study Karremans’ letter and
arrange things with him in situ. He
asked Karremans to be patient.[3]
Sarajevo favoured the route via Kladanj to
Busovaca, where the Dutch-Belgian transport battalion was stationed. The route
via Zvornik to Zagreb was the second choice because of the limited reception
facilities in Zagreb.[4]
Karremans could not agree with the first priority because, in his opinion, the
route via Kladanj was not the more logical of the two options. In his book he
does not mince words on this choice: ‘Who on earth thought that one up? (…) How
can they even consider it? Don’t they keep up to date with the messages and maps
at the higher level? Kladanj is closed, isn’t it?’ Karremans saw only one
realistic option: to head for Zagreb via Zvornik, or else for Belgrade.[5]
Karremans had a point. The route via Kladanj
was not in use, and it was impossible for road traffic to pass the
confrontation line there. Convoys of Displaced Persons and a convoy of wounded
had left for Kladanj in vain. In any case, fighting was still going on along
this route. The Bosnian Serbs also refused to allow the International Red Cross
to use this route for the transportation of the wounded from Potocari on 17
July. In his book Karremans also refers to a discussion he had with Couzy on 13
July in which he asked for further guidelines – which he never received. In a
conversation with Colonel Dedden, Chief of the Army Crisis Staff, Karremans
learned the following day that attention was being paid to a departure via
Zagreb as well as via Busovaca; a departure via Belgrade was not feasible. The
Dutch-Belgian transport battalion was ready for the reception; the idea was to
stay there for two days.[6]
According to Brantz in Tuzla, the arrangements
for the Dutchbat withdrawal were also causing considerable irritation and
frustration between The Hague, Potocari, Tuzla and the Dutch officers in the UN
chain of command. Potocari and Tuzla were not asked for their opinion: The
Hague and Sarajevo had jointly decided that the route via Kladanj to Busovaca
was preferable to Zvornik-Belgrade-Zagreb. Brantz said that the contingent
Commander of the Dutch troops in Bosnia, Colonel Verschraegen, had advised The
Hague along the same lines. This way they could make use of the reception and
care facilities in Busovaca.
Like Karremans, Brantz was surprised by the
choice of route, given previous experience and the recurrent skirmishes.
Additionally, it meant crossing more territory of Republika Srpska than a route
that went via Zvornik. Brantz also took up contact with the Defence Crisis
Management Centre and the Army Crisis Staff: ‘Had they lost their minds, I
asked, barely able to conceal my irritation.’ Dutchbat had to leave the
territory of Republika Srpska as soon as possible and this meant, according to
Brantz, that it should take the route via Zvornik. What is more, a service
support area needed to be set up as close as possible to Potocari in order to
provide Dutchbat with help, to transfer vehicles and materiel, to get the
personnel onto buses, and to mount the
APCs on trailers.[7]
Karremans and Nicolai heard from the Army
Crisis Staff that the higher echelons in the UN were sticking to the plan for a
departure to Busovaca. According to Karremans, he asked the contingent
Commander Verschraegen, the Army Crisis Staff and the Bosnia-Hercegovina
Command in Sarajevo three times to relocate Dutchbat to Zagreb and not to
Busovaca. He could not understand why no-one listened to him. Eventually, he
sought contact with Brantz who told him that the decision to go to Busovaca was
taken mainly on the basis of personnel considerations.[8]
According to Van Baal, Deputy Commander of the
Army, the main advantage of Busovaca was that the Dutch would then be in
control; in these more remote surroundings the Ministry of Defence would be in
a better position to shield Dutchbat from curious outsiders than in Zagreb.
Actually, to Dutchbat one of the attractions of Zagreb was its airport, which
would expedite the journey home. Van Baal, in particular, had pushed for
Busovaca, and for the organization of a short debriefing there in relative
peace and quiet. The chaotic arrival of the 55 previous Dutchbat hostages at
Soesterberg airport had strengthened his convictions.[9]
On 18 July, the logistics staff at UN
headquarters in Zagreb was still to express a preference for a departure to
central Bosnia. Contrary to the situation in the Netherlands, this was based on
economic rather than personnel considerations: central Bosnia was the simplest
and cheapest option, especially if the Dutchbat equipment was to be made ready
for a new deployment in Bosnia. A second option was a withdrawal via Ljubovija
(situated opposite Bratunac on the Serb side of the Drina) to Camp Pleso near
Zagreb. The vehicles could be brought from Serbia to Zagreb by road or rail,
but this would take more time to plan. A timescale of fourteen days was even
quoted.[10]
For a long time Zagreb stuck to a withdrawal of the personnel to Busovaca and
the materiel to Zenica. This may have been partly motivated by the thought that
the equipment would have to be left behind in the event of a withdrawal via
Serbia.
On 20 July the buses and helicopters had
already been requested to take Dutchbat from Busovaca to Split, where it could
be flown back to the Netherlands. It was certain at that time that there would
be no opportunity for a debriefing in Split. If this was still to take place in
the mission region then it would have to be in Zagreb.[11]
The Commander of Sector North East, Brigadier
General Haukland, was not involved in the arrangements for the Dutchbat
departure. He had not even been informed of it. Be that as it may, Haukland was
acquainted with the instructions that Dutchbat had received. He said to
Minister Pronk, who was on a working visit to Tuzla, that Sarajevo’s
instruction to Karremans that he must not leave before all the enclave
residents were able to depart was not particularly clear. Haukland complained
that orders were no longer going through Sector North East and that no-one had
told him that Dutchbat was no longer under his command; obviously, Sarajevo had
not taken the trouble to inform him. It was a common complaint at Tuzla that
Sarajevo broke the lines of command. At one point Haukland had called the Chief
of Operations in Sarajevo to tell him that he had lost contact with Dutchbat.
The answer was that the battalion was already on its way to Zagreb.[12]
Apparently, the decision on the route was
clinched during the meeting with, amongst others, General Smith in Belgrade on
15 July. It was then that Mladic agreed to a withdrawal of Dutchbat – with
local UN personnel – via Belgrade on 21 July. Mladic also agreed that a convoy
could supply Dutchbat prior to the departure. Mladic made a ‘gentleman’s
agreement’ with Smith that he would do his best to get back as much as possible
of the Dutchbat equipment that had been stolen by the VRS; nothing, however,
came of this.[13] The
materiel looted by the VRS was never returned.
Mladic did nonetheless honour the agreement on
the arrival of the convoy. This convoy, carrying plentiful supplies of fuel for
the return trip, had already been requested by UNPROFOR in Pale on18 July.[14]
Mladic also stuck to the agreement on the transport of the equipment: Dutchbat
was allowed to take all of it.
On 20 July there was momentary panic, when
Colonel P. Kracmar, the representative of the Force Commander in Belgrade, came
with the disheartening news that the headquarters in Zagreb had failed to
notice that Serbia was a sovereign state and had to be asked formally for
permission before Dutchbat could cross its territory. Kracmar pointed this out
to Janvier after a meeting with Colonel Vuksic, the representative of the General
Staff of the VJ. This permission had not yet been requested and the necessary
procedures could mean a two-day delay in the timetable for the Dutchbat
withdrawal. To make matters worse, separate permission was needed for the APLs.
There were, moreover, restrictions for crossing
Serb territory, because small pockets of armed Bosnian Muslims were still
active in the area along the Drina. These had come from the column that was
trying to reach Tuzla. In addition, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not
guarantee safe passage for the local UN personnel. As long as no permission
came from the Yugoslav authorities, the Dutchbat convoys would be stopped at
the border. Though arrangements had been agreed with Mladic on the Bosnian-Serb
side, he had no jurisdiction in Yugoslavia.[15]
After Belgrade, Dutchbat would travel on to Zagreb. What happened to the
battalion thereafter will be discussed in detail in Part IV.
In the long run the alarming news from Belgrade
did not cause a delay. Neither did the position adopted by the international
community at the London Conference of 21 July (a joint stance should be taken
to prevent a further Bosnian-Serb advance) throw a spanner in the works.
Minister Voorhoeve was momentarily afraid that this standpoint could tempt the Bosnian
Serbs still to take Dutchbat hostage in order to stave off any air strikes.[16]
This was not the case. General Mladic ordered
the Drina corps and the Bratunac Brigade to do everything possible to ensure
that Dutchbat could leave with dignity. The Commander of the Bratunac Brigade,
in particular, had to make sure that his staff behaved correctly and he was
ordered to escort convoys from and to Potocari. No-one other than Mladic
himself was permitted to make arrangements with Dutchbat on a departure or a
longer stay. Mladic would be in charge of the Dutchbat escort on 21 July.[17]
On 21 July Dutchbat was able to leave the
enclave and make its way to Zagreb. It was not Smith and Mladic who supervised
the withdrawal – as had been agreed – because Smith had already left for the
London conference. Nicolai did the honours. For Mladic, the departure of
Dutchbat was the only occasion upon which he returned to Srebrenica.
According to Sergeant J. Zwiers, the actual
departure from Bratunac was well organized by the VRS: ‘I’m sorry to say it,
but the Serbs had organized it perfectly. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
couldn’t have done any better.’ The conduct of the VRS was exemplary; only some
of the locals made throat-slitting gestures.[18]
[1] SMG 1004. Outgoing fax HQ UNPROFOR
Sarajevo from COS to Dutchbat, 131800B Jul 1995, Fax No. 266/95. See ibidem for the English version.
[2] NIOD, Coll. Brantz. Letter CO-1(NL)UN Infbn to General Mladic 13/07/95, No. TK95115.
[3]
SMG, 1004. Letter Lt.-Gen. Ratko
Mladic to Lt.-Col. Karremans, 14/07/95, No. 06/17-460. Karremans sent the
letter on to Nicolai, Brantz and Janvier.
[4] SMG 1004. Outgoing fax HQ UNPROFOR
Sarajevo from COS to Dutchbat, 131800B Jul 1995, Fax No. 266/95. See ibidem for the English version. NIOD
Coll. Brantz.
[5] Karremans, Srebrenica, Who Cares?, p. 224.
[6] Karremans, Srebrenica, Who Cares?, p. 226-7. With addition by Karremans
25/11/00.
[7] NIOD, Coll. Brantz. Diary Brantz,
(version August 2000).
[8] Karremans, Srebrenica, Who Cares?, p. 234-5.
[9] Interview A.P.P.M. van Baal,
01/11/01.
[10] DAB. Interoffice Memorandum, Maj.
Porter, JLOC Plans to Wing Comd Bernard, DCJLOC, 18/07/95; SMG/1004/75. Fax
sent from AMA COS UNPF-HQ to DCBC, RNLA Crisis Staff, COS UNPROFOR, 181700B Jul
95.
[11] DCBC, 2823. Fax 1(NL) UN Cie
Logbase Split to OCKlu, 20/07/95.
[12] ABZ, DPV/ARA/01654. Memorandum
DMP/NH to R, 31/07/95, No. NH-618/95 with summary of trip R to Tuzla and
Sarajevo, 14-18 July 1995; interview Hagrup Haukland, 03/05/99.
[13] NIOD, Coll. De Ruiter. ‘Meeting Gen. Smith/Gen. Mladic - 19 Jul 95’, drafted by Lt-Col. J.R.J. Baxter, 19/07/95.
[14] NIOD, Coll. De Ruiter. HQ UNPROFOR
G3 Convoy Ops to UNMO Pale, 181000B Jul 95, No. 20-096/07.
[15] UNNY, UNPROFOR, Box 87290 SRFC
Belgrade, 13 March - 10 Oct 95. Fax SRFC-B to Lt-Gen. B. Janvier, 201640B Jul 95. UNPROFOR New York Box 8729o SRFC
Belgrade, 13 March - 10 Oct 95.
[16] E-mail Bert Kreemers to NIOD,
23/01/02.
[17] ICTY, (IT-98-33) D 83/a, Army of
the Republic of Srpska General Staff to Drina Corps, 1st Bratunac
Light Infantry Brigade (for attention of the commanders), 20/07/95, No.
06/18-279.
[18] Interview J. Zwiers, 28/04/99.