In my recent post “America’s Tangled Kosovo Web,” I outlined the impossible relationship we embarked upon with our “friends” in Greater Albania. I also made the point that rather than showing the lawless, supremacist Albanians the way, they have been showing us the way. To illustrate the point with just one example, I posted an advisory for jobs at the U.S. military base there, Camp Bondsteel:

camp bondsteel jobs


Just visit Camp Bondsteel and ask someone. But you should know that for most jobs available to locals you will need to be fluent in English. You should also be aware that they don’t offer as many jobs to people of Serbian nationality because of the risk of infiltration, so basically this means that if you are Albanian you have a better chance of getting a job.

I then wrote: “The most Swiftian part of this is the ‘risk of infiltration’ by Serbs. No worries about infiltration by Islamists or KLA elements, since that is precisely whom Bondsteel serves.”

Further to that “infiltration” concern, as I excerpted before from Hiding Genocide in Kosovo:

KFOR employed several interpreters, both Albanian and Serbian, and some of the Serbian interpreters shared their experiences with me.

One Serbian interpreter recalls that he often accompanied the British soldiers on their patrols. He noticed that the British soldiers swallowed everything they were told by Albanians, especially in the beginning. Right away he began to notice a pattern. He realised at an early stage in that summer of 1999, all the Albanian interpreters suddenly appeared with mobile phones, a rare site in those days. None of the Serbian interpreters had such luxuries.

The strategy was simple: a British KFOR unit would leave their base planning a routine patrol or in response to news of an incident and then one of the Albanian interpreters would phone and tip off the perpetrators.

And here:

…[T]he Serbs had very few guns to defend themselves with and those they had were kept in the house or some place nearby where they could be obtained quickly. At this stage Serb households expected an attack at any time. Thus, British KFOR searching houses for guns usually found them inside a Serb house. They almost never found them in Albanian houses because, not expecting to be attacked themselves, and usually being informed beforehand of searches by the Albanian interpreters [for KFOR], they could afford the luxury of hiding them more securely such as burying them in the garden.

…On numerous occasions, an “anonymous” Albanian would report that there were weapons in a specific Serbian house. Very soon afterwards, British KFOR would search that house and remove any offensive items, but later that night the Albanians would know the house was now “clean”, and the house could be torched, usually the same night…

And here:

One source began working with KFOR in June, 1999…He remembers that one of the Albanian interpreters working with the British was particularly vociferous in her propaganda campaign against the Serbs. She really tried to poison the minds of the KFOR soldiers against all Serbs. She was having an affair with one of the senior Green Howards [a British regiment] officers and was obviously in a position to influence procedures. Ironically, this interpreter was a member of the family that had opened the Albanian separatist café in the 1990s where the owner had actually worked for the Serbian secret police.

As is often the case, the children of people like this have to prove themselves and show they are more extreme than anyone else.

The cosy relationship between most of the British KFOR contingent in Kosovo Polje and their Albanian interpreters meant that whether they were aware of it or not, British KFOR were being used by the Albanians to help them ethnically cleanse the town and its surrounding villages.

And here:

[The Institute for European Policy authors] describe both UNMIK and KFOR as infiltrated by agents of organized crime who forewarn their ringleaders of any impending raids. “The majority of criminal incidents do not become public because of fear of reprisals.

And there was this — Kosovo Polje, 1999, from Hiding Genocide in Kosovo:

No one was prepared for the savage assault launched that sunny September day on innocent market goers. Incredibly, the evening before the attack a phone call warning of an attack on the market was made to a local humanitarian organisation’s offices…Staff at the centre immediately telephoned the UNMIK Police station and the British KFOR base to warn them. An Albanian answered the telephone and promised to inform KFOR of the warning. Somehow, nothing was done. Maybe the message was passed on and maybe it was not. The reality is no warning was given to the shoppers who attended the market the next day. No KFOR security was present even though they had been warned.

That morning as the market was crowded with shoppers the attackers lobbed at least two grenades into the middle of the market. Three Serbs died instantly. One more died two months later and many more were injured. Most of them were elderly men, women and small children. The market was only 500 metres away from the nearest British KFOR base. The two attackers, both in their late teens, were seen running away from the house in which they had hidden to launch their attack. Although they were identified by several eye witnesses, they were never accused of this attack. Later, one of those identified as being involved in the green market attack was detained by Norwegian KFOR who came across him accosting a five year old Serbian girl in the street. He was holding her by the arm and burning her with a cigarette.

Norwegian KFOR soldiers infuriated by this sight took the suspect, stripped him and tied him to a fence and proceeded to beat him. Soon afterwards, apparently alerted by a member of the public, members of the British military police unit arrived and took the suspect away….he was never charged with anything.

To close, here is just some more damning background about our friend Ramush Haradinaj and his blacklisted brother Daut:

The Haradinaj Brothers and Their Involvement in Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily - December 15, 2004

…In 1996, back in the Balkans, [Ramush Haradinaj] completed his diversionary terrorist training. In Albania, he took part in establishing the logistics bases of al-Qaida in Kuks [Kukes] and Tropoj, and later used these bases, with a group of trusted associates, as key elements in the chain to transport weapons to Serbia’s Kosovo and Metohija province.

In mid-1997, Haradinaj…together with his brothers, Daut and Shkelzen, organized terrorist attacks against the police department in the village of Ranic, Municipality of Decani, and the village of Ponosevac, Municipality of Djakovica, and on the refugee camps in Junik and Babaloc.

At the beginning of 1998, in Glodjani [Glodjane], he formed a diversionary terrorist group which, following his orders, intercepted and threatened Serbs and Albanians loyal to the Republic of Serbia. This group, headed by the Haradinaj brothers, attacked a police patrol in the village of Glodjani, in which Miodrag Otovic was murdered.

In April 1998, the terrorist group, led by Ramush Haradinaj, established the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) general staff in Glodjani for Metohija….At the same time, on his initiative, a special KLA unit was formed in Glodjani, called “Black Eagles”, whose commander was Idriz Balaj, aka “Toger”. Under the leadership of Ramush Haradinaj, the “Black Eagles” kidnapped and murdered dozens of Serb civilians. A number of bodies were found in the Radonjic Lake and village wells in the Decani Municipality.

After Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was formed out of the KLA, following the end of the NATO attacks on Serbia, Haradinaj was appointed Deputy Commander to the KPC Commander, Agim [C]eku. Towards the end of 2000, he left the KPC and established the ABK party. In order to maintain his influence over KPC, he managed to place his brother Daut as the commander of the 3rd RTG of KPC which carries out the assassinations of Ramush’s political rivals…

Ramush Haradinaj has been regarded by Serbian authorities as the most influential criminal in Metohija, in the region of Pec, Decani and Djakovica. In cooperation with Ekrem Lluka and Naser Kelmendi, he created a criminal organization which controls the organized smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, oil, oil derivates, weapons, vehicles and other goods….

A part of the acquired profit from the criminal activities of Haradinaj and his criminal group was given to KPC, and from the same source, a significant part of the financial means was forwarded to Nazim Haradinaj, who supplied the Albanian terrorists in Macedonia with weapons.

Aiming to free his brother from prison, Haradinaj, with the mediation of Avdyl Mushkoli [Mushkolaj], organized demonstrations and initiated the formation of a group of some 30 people who attempted to release Daut Haradinaj by force from the Dubrava prison, Istok Municipality.

In January 2003, Haradinaj organized the assassination of Tahir Zemaj, a FARK commander, his son Enis and nephew Hysen, on the Pristina-Pec road, in the vicinity of a lumber plant, due to the fact that Zemaj was supposed to be the State witness in the proceedings against Daut Haradinaj and himself. […]

Dossier: Involvement of Haradinaj Brothers in Terrorist and Criminal Activities in Kosov
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily - December 16, 2004 Thursday

Intelligence sources, and sources within the Kosovo Islamist and Albanian national movements, have begun to provide detailed information on the two brothers of the newly-elected Prime Minister of the Serbian province of Kosovo & Metohija, [Ramush Haradinaj], 36. …

BUJAR (Rasim) HARADINAJ…was responsible for some 180 terrorist attacks, among which were armed attacks on the villages of Ljodja and Babaloc, in the middle of 1998, as well as for the forced expulsion of the population from the territory of Djakovica, Pec and Decani, and for setting the Orthodox church in the village of Gornji Rasic on fire.

Bujar Haradinaj was the immediate perpetrator of a number of armed attacks on the members of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and the Serbia & Montenegro forces. Together with Agim Selmani and Daut Haradinaj, he took part in the attack on the members of the Army and police, in August 1998…

DAUT HARADINAJ…In the Glodjani prison, which was under direct control of Ramush and Daut Haradinaj, a large number of Serbs were murdered… He is the direct perpetrator of a number of assassinations, and he organized the assassination of…political rivals of Hashim Thaqi (Thaci).

After the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was formed by NATO and European authorities out of the KLA, Daut Haradinaj was the deputy commander…. Upon achieving KPC command, he was in charge of coordinating operations with the Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaida . In that capacity, he organized a meeting with leading al-Qaida military leader Mohammed al-Zawahiri, brother of the ideological leader of al-Qaida, Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri.

Daut Haradinaj was suspended from KPC in 2001 because he was placed on the US blacklist of organizations and individuals who, due to terrorist activities, had restricted access to financial aid; ie: who were forbidden to enter the US.

Until his arrest by KFOR in July 2002, Daut Haradinaj directly participated in the attacks on the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia, together with National Liberation Army (NLA: also known as ANA; a re-emergence of the KLA) members, and he was also active in the area of arms and drugs trafficking, as part of the criminal group led by Ramush Haradinaj. […]